This paper establishes a robust link between momentum and credit rating. Momentum profitability is large and significant among low-grade firms, but it is nonexistent among high-grade firms. The momentum payoffs documented in the literature are generated by low-grade firms that account for less than 4% of the overall market capitalization of rated firms. The momentum payoff differential across credit rating groups is unexplained by firm size, firm age, analyst forecast dispersion, leverage, return volatility, and cash flow volatility.
have documented that the momentum-based trading strategy of buying past winners and selling past losers provides statistically significant and economically large payoffs. The empirical evidence on stock return momentum has been particularly intriguing because it points to a violation of weak-form market efficiency.
In particular, Fama and French (1996) show that momentum profitability is the only CAPM-related anomaly unexplained by the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model. Moreover, Schwert (2003) demonstrates that market anomalies related to profit opportunities, including the size and value effects in the cross section of average returns, as well as time-series predictability by the dividend yield, typically disappear, reverse, or attenuate following their discovery. In contrast, Jegadeesh and Titman (2001, 2002) document the profitability of momentum strategies after its initial discovery. The robustness of momentum profitability has generated a variety of explanations, both behavioral and risk based. It has also been shown that momentum profitability is related to business conditions. Specifically, Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) document that momentum payoffs are large during expansions and non-existent during recessions. Avramov and Chordia (2005) demonstrate that the impact of past returns on future returns cannot be captured by conditional and unconditional risk-based asset pricing models. However, they show that the momentum payoffs are related to the component of model mispricing that varies with business cycle variables such as the Treasury Bill yield, the term spread, and the default spread. Since credit risk varies over the business cycle, it is natural to ask whether the momentum payoffs are related to the credit risk of firms. In this paper, we provide a new and unexplored dimension in understanding the profitability of momentum strategies. We show that momentum profits are restricted to high credit risk firms and are nonexistent for firms of high credit quality.
Specifically, based on a sample of 3,578 NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ firms rated by S&P over the July 1985-December 2003 period, 2 we show that over formation periods of three, six, nine, and twelve months, the extreme loser and winner portfolios of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) consist of stocks with the lowest and the next lowest credit rating, respectively. The average rating of the entire sample of rated firms is BBB. The extreme loser (winner) portfolio has an average rating of BB− (BB+). The extreme losers and winners are the only non-investment grade portfolios in the sample of rated firms.
Trading strategies that condition on three credit rating and ten prior six-month return groups yield momentum payoffs that increase monotonically with the credit riskthey increase from an insignificant 0.27% per month for the best quality debt tercile to a significant 2.35% for the worst. Similarly, based on ten credit rating and three past return portfolios, momentum payoffs increase from an insignificant 0.07% per month for the highest credit quality decile to a significant 2.04% for the worst. Among the low rated firms, loser stocks are the dominant source of return continuation and the profitability of momentum strategies. Based on ten credit risk and three past return groups, the return differential between the lowest and highest credit risk loser firms averages 1.60% per month, whereas the return differential for the winner firms is, on average, only 0.37%.
We also implement momentum strategies based on the prior six-month return for different samples of rated firms, as we sequentially exclude the lowest rated firms. Strikingly, the significant profits to momentum strategies are derived from a sample of firms that accounts for less than four percent of the market capitalization of all rated firms and for about 22 percent of the total number of rated firms. When we exclude firms with an overall S&P rating of D, C, CC, CCC−, CCC+, B−, B, B+ and BB−, the momentum strategy payoffs from the remaining firms, which account for 96.6% of the overall market capitalization of rated firms, become statistically insignificant.
Recent work has demonstrated the significance of momentum for certain subsamples of stocks. For instance, Jiang, Lee, and Zhang (2006) and Zhang (2006) demonstrate higher momentum payoffs among firms with higher information uncertainty. Information uncertainty is proxied by firm size, firm age, return volatility, cash flow volatility, and analyst forecast dispersion. However, our findings suggests that the credit rating effect on momentum is independent of and is much stronger than the effect of all these information uncertainty variables. In particular, the information uncertainty variables do not capture the momentum profits across credit rating groups but credit rating does capture the momentum profits across the uncertainty variables. Specifically, momentum payoffs occur among large-capitalization firms that are low rated, but are absent in small-capitalization highly rated firms. Thus, while momentum profitability does not exclusively arise in small stocks, it is exclusively found amongst low rated stocks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the data.
Section II. presents the results and Section III. presents robustness checks. Section IV.
concludes.
I. Data
We extract monthly returns on all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks listed in the CRSP database, subject to several selection criteria. First, stocks must have at least six consecutive monthly return observations. In addition, as in Jegadeesh and Titman (2001), we exclude stocks that, at the beginning of the holding period, are priced below $5 or have market capitalization that would place them in the bottom NYSE decile.
While this is done to ensure that the empirical findings are not driven by low priced and extremely illiquid stocks, we find that our results are robust to the inclusion of stocks below $5 and those that belong to the smallest decile. The filtering procedure delivers a universe of 13,018 stocks. From this universe, we choose those stocks that are rated by Standard & Poor's, leaving us with 3,578 rated stocks over the July 1985 through December 2003 period. The beginning of our sample is determined by the first time firm ratings by Standard & Poor's become available on the COMPUSTAT tapes.
The S&P issuer rating used here is an essential component of our analysis. The
Standard & Poor's assigns this rating to a firm, not an individual bond. As defined by S&P, prior to 1998, this issuer rating is based on the firm's most senior publicly traded debt. After 1998, this rating is based on the overall quality of the firm's outstanding debt, either public or private. Before 1998, the issuer rating represents a select subsample of company bonds. After 1998, it represents all company debt. We transform the S&P ratings into conventional numerical scores. In particular, 1 represents a rating of AAA and 22 reflects a D rating. 3 Thus, a higher numerical score corresponds to a lower credit rating or higher credit risk. Numerical ratings of 10 or below (BBB− or better) are considered investment-grade, and ratings of 11 or higher (BB+ or worse) are labelled high-yield or non-investment grade. The equally weighted average rating of the 3,578 firms in our sample is 8.83 (approximately BBB, the investment-grade threshold) and the median is 9 (BBB).
To make sure that our sample of stocks is representative, in Table I we compare rated and unrated firms. It is important to note that although the total number of rated firms is much smaller than that of unrated firms (there are 3,578 rated firms and 9,440 unrated firms, a ratio of 2.6 to 1), the average per month number of rated and unrated firms are considerably closer (1,639 rated firms and 2,246 unrated firms, a more appealing ratio of 1.4 to 1). Table I Panel A of Table I presents monthly returns for the loser portfolio (P1), the winner portfolio (P10), and the momentum strategy of buying the winner and selling the loser portfolio (P10−P1). Momentum portfolios are constructed as in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) . At the beginning of each month t, we rank all eligible stocks on the basis of their cumulative return over the formation period (months t − 6 to t − 1) and assign them to one of ten portfolios based on their prior six-month return. These portfolios are then held for K months. We skip a month between the formation and holding periods (months t+1 to t+K). Each portfolio return is calculated as the equally weighted average return of the corresponding stocks. The monthly momentum strategy return for a K-month holding period is based on an equally weighted average of the portfolio returns from strategies implemented in the current month and the previous K − 1 months. Overall, Table I confirms that our sample of rated firms is representative. Both rated and unrated firms produce similar momentum profits, they share similar industry distributions, and they have similar stock return distributions.
II. Results
A. Momentum and firm credit rating over the formation period
To establish the first link between momentum trading strategies and credit risk, we examine the average numerical credit rating for each of the ten momentum portfolios over formation periods of three, six, nine, and twelve months. The results are presented in Table II . The extreme loser portfolio (P1) is heavily tilted towards firms with the lowest quality debt. For example, focusing on a six-month formation period, the average numerical rating of the loser portfolio is 13.06 (BB−), which is much above the average rating of 8.83 (BBB). The extreme winner portfolio (P10) also consists of high credit risk stocks, recording an average credit rating of 11.19 (BB+). The middle portfolio (P6) has the best credit rating of 7.64 (BBB+). Indeed, the average credit rating forms a U-shape across the various momentum portfolios. This suggests that the momentum strategy of buying previous losers and selling previous winners essentially takes long and short positions in firms with the highest credit risk. Table II   Table III presents the composition of unrated, investment grade, and non-investment grade firms in decile portfolios sorted on past six month returns. There are more unrated firms in the extreme winner and loser portfolios. Also, there are significantly fewer firms with investment grade rating and more firms with non-investment grade rating in the extreme portfolios. Finally, the return differential between the winner and loser portfolios is a statistically insignificant (significant) 0.77% (2.12%) per month for the investment (non-investment) grade firms and is 1.48% for the unrated firms. Overall, the evidence supports our claim that low credit rated firms, or firms that would be low rated if they had a rating, drive the momentum phenomenon. Table III B. Momentum profitability and credit rating
We implement momentum strategies by conditioning on both credit rating and cumulative six-month formation period returns. We first consider three credit rating groups and ten formation period return portfolios. We then study ten credit rating groups and three past six-month return portfolios. Credit-risk-past-return groups are formed on a sequential basis, sorting first on credit rating and then on past returns. 5 For each month t, the low/high credit risk group (group 1 / group 3) contains the 30% best/worst rated stocks based on their S&P rating for this particular month. The stocks in each group are then divided into ten momentum portfolios based on their return over months t − 6 to t − 1. The ten credit risk groups are formed each month by dividing the sample of firms in that month into deciles based on the credit ratings. Each of the resulting credit rating groups is then divided into three momentum portfolios (P1, P2, P3) containing the worst 30%, middle 40%, and top 30% performers based on their past six-month returns. The two sequential rankings generate 30 credit-risk-momentum portfolios.
Panel A of Table IV presents the momentum profits corresponding to the three credit risk and ten momentum groups. Payoffs to momentum strategies strongly depend upon the credit rating. Focusing on the low (stocks with an average rating of 4.97 ≈ A+) and medium (rating of 8.5 ≈ BBB+) credit risk groups, the average payoff to the P10−P1 strategy is 0.27% (t-stat=0.88) and 0.75% (t-stat=2.12) per month, respectively. The payoff is much larger as well as statistically and economically significant at 2.35% (tstat=4.21) for the highest credit risk group (rating of 13.02 ≈ BB−). Momentum profits are highest in firms with the poorest quality of outstanding debt, as rated by S&P. This is a new finding that sheds light on the source of profitability of momentum strategies. Table IV Momentum strategy payoffs in the non-January months are also insignificant for the lowest risk tercile. For the medium risk stocks the momentum payoffs are a significant 0.95% per month and for the high risk stocks the payoffs are 2.70% per month. The payoffs in January are negative albeit statistically insignificant. During recessions, the momentum strategy payoffs increase monotonically with credit risk but are statistically insignificant. 6 On the other hand, during expansions, not only do the payoffs increase monotonically with credit risk, but they are a statistically and economically significant 2.30% per month for the poorest credit quality firms.
Panel B of Table IV presents the results for ten credit risk and three momentum portfolios. Again, the evidence shows that momentum profits strongly depend on credit risk. Focusing on the lowest risk group (average rating 3.17 ≈ AA), the monthly momentum profit (P3−P1) is an insignificant 0.07%. Payoffs to momentum strategies increase monotonically across the credit rating groups. The highest momentum payoff of 2.04%
(t-stat=4.63) per month is recorded for the highest credit risk group (average rating 14.52 ≈ B). Consistent with the results in Table III momentum profits become statistically significant only when the credit quality deteriorates to a rating of BBB− or below (BBB or below for the non-January months). During economic expansions, it is once again only stocks rated BBB− or lower that exhibit significant momentum profits. Thus far, we have examined the relation between momentum profitability and credit risk using portfolio strategies based on double sorting, first by credit risk then by prior six-month return. We now turn to implementing the traditional momentum strategies, those based only on prior six-month return, but we consider different investment subsamples. In particular, we start with the entire sample of rated firms and then sequentially exclude firms with the highest credit risk (worst credit rating). This analysis will reveal the subsample of firms that drives momentum profits. number of firms included in each subsample. These two measures are computed each month, and we report the time-series average. The payoffs to momentum strategies are insignificant at the 5% level when the investment sample contains stocks in the rating range AAA through BB. Remarkably, this sample accounts for 96.62% of the market capitalization of the rated firms and it contains 78.84% of the total number of the rated firms. In other words, the momentum profits are derived from a sample of firms that accounts for less than four percent of the total market capitalization of all rated firms or less than twenty-two percent of all rated firms. Table V As we progressively drop the best-rated firms (results available upon request), the momentum profits increase monotonically as only the worst-rated firms remain in the sample. For a sample of stocks rated B or lower, the momentum profit amounts to 3.74% per month. More remarkably, there are only about 70 firms on average per month that are rated B or lower. These 70 firms comprise only 0.77% of the sample by market capitalization and 4.22% of the total number of firms. In other words, the momentum phenomenon occurs in a small fraction of the worst rated stocks.
Panel B of

III. Robustness checks
In this section we conduct numerous checks to ensure that the impact of credit rating on momentum is robust to various alternative explanations.
A. Could credit ratings proxy for systematic risk?
Thus far, we have examined raw momentum strategy payoffs. A natural exercise would be to risk-adjust the raw payoffs to ensure that the profitability of momentum strategies among high credit risk firms does not merely compensate for exposures to common sources of risk. We regress the momentum payoffs for the three credit risk groups on the three Fama and French (1993) factors as well on the excess market return.
Focusing on the Fama-French factors (available upon request) we find that the monthly alphas are 0.41% (t-stat=1.28), 1.02% (t-stat=2.85), and 2.53% (t-stat=4.47) for the low, middle, and high credit risk groups, respectively. If anything, the alphas are higher than the raw momentum payoffs reported in Table IV , suggesting that loser stocks are riskier than winner stocks and that the momentum strategy does not have positive exposure to systematic risk factors. The evidence strongly suggests that momentum profitability across high credit risk firms does not represent compensation for systematic risk, at least based on the CAPM and the Fama-French three factor model.
B. Momentum profits in various subsamples
Recent work argues that momentum is stronger in stocks that have high information uncertainty. Information uncertainty is the degree of ambiguity about firm fundamentals. High information uncertainty firms can be associated with higher information acquisition costs and less reliable estimates of their value. Specifically, Jiang, Lee, and
Zhang (2006) and Zhang (2006) argue that the price drift is larger in stocks with greater information uncertainty, which is proxied by firm size, firm age, analyst coverage, dispersion in analyst forecasts, return volatility, and cash flow volatility.
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An essential question that arises is whether the impact of credit ratings on momentum profitability is subsumed by information uncertainty. To address this question, we assess the robustness of momentum profitability across the credit rating dimension based on 3 × 3 portfolios sorted independently on credit rating and variables that proxy for information uncertainty. In sum, sorting on credit rating provides a payoff differential in momentum strategies, but the same need not hold for sorting on size, return volatility, leverage, cash flow volatility, firm age, and analyst forecast dispersion. 11 These proxies for information uncertainty seem to provide differential momentum payoffs only in the case of the high credit risk stocks, whereas credit risk provides differential momentum payoffs across different values of the information uncertainty variables. The evidence strongly suggests that credit risk has an independent effect not captured by variables that proxy for information uncertainty. Table II shows that, over the formation period, the extreme loser and winner portfolios contain a disproportionately large number of high credit risk firms. Moreover, the average credit rating of the loser stocks (BB-) is lower than that of the winner stocks (BB+). We also find that the difference in returns between the highest and the lowest decile rating group is 0.61% per month and the difference between the highest and the second to last rating decile portfolio is 0.18% per month, suggesting that distressed stocks experience lower average returns. To summarize, we have the following three facts: (i) the momentum strategy goes long (short) the winner (loser) stocks, (ii) loser stocks have, on average, lower ratings than winner stocks, and (iii) lower rated stocks earn lower returns. These three facts combined suggest that the impact of distress should result in higher returns for momentum portfolios that are long winners and short losers.
C. The impact of distress
Thus, an essential question that arises is whether the impact of credit ratings on momentum profitability is entirely explained by distressed stocks that realize lower returns.
We rule out this possibility for several reasons. First, the maximum return differential across decile rating portfolios is only 61 basis points per month (results not reported), whereas, as noted earlier, the return differential across winner and loser low-rated stocks is over 2% per month. Moreover, we implement momentum strategies on credit-ratingadjusted returns by subtracting the matched decile credit rating portfolio holding period return from the individual stock holding period return. The rating-momentum relation is robust to such an adjustment (results available upon request). Finally, observe from Panel C of Table VI that the impact of leverage on momentum strategy profits is far smaller than that of credit rating. Since leverage can be thought of as a proxy for distress, this suggests that it is not distress but credit ratings that drive our results.
D. Other robustness checks
Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) document that industry momentum accounts for much of the individual stock return momentum. Hence, stronger momentum in lower rated stocks could be attributed to such stocks being concentrated in one particular industry that consistently exhibits higher momentum. However, we confirm that our findings are not driven by industry momentum. In particular, following Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999), we compute industry-adjusted stock returns by subtracting from each stock return over the holding period, the return of the corresponding industry over the same period. The credit risk effect on momentum profitability is robust to such an industry adjustment (results are unreported but available upon request).
In a similar manner, we have implemented further robustness checks, controlling for size, volatility, trading volume, illiquidity, analyst coverage, and analyst forecast dispersion. Indeed, low rated stocks are smaller, have higher volatility, lower liquidity, lower analyst coverage, and higher forecast dispersion than high rated stocks. We subtract the decile portfolio return corresponding to the above characteristics from the holding period returns of the individual stocks in the winner and the loser portfolios. The re-sults (available upon request) show that the link between momentum and credit risk remains strong and significant even after controlling for the above potentially relevant momentum determinants.
IV. Conclusion
This paper establishes a strong link between momentum profitability and firm credit rating. The empirical findings are based on a sample of 3,578 NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ firms rated by S&P over the July 1985-December 2003 period. The selected sample is representative, as rated and non-rated firms share similar characteristics in terms of (i) their stock return distribution, (ii) the momentum profits they generate, and (iii) their industry distribution among the 20 industries studied by Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) .
The extreme winner and loser portfolios are comprised mainly of high credit risk stocks. Momentum profitability is statistically significant and economically large among low-rated firms, but it is nonexistent among high-grade firms. The results are robust and cannot be explained by the information uncertainty variables as proxied by firm size, firm age, analyst forecast dispersion, leverage, return volatility, and cash flow volatility.
Excluding from the analysis the highest credit risk firms, which account altogether for less than four percent of market capitalization of rated firms, renders the momentum profitability statistically insignificant.
Indeed, our cross-sectional analysis explicitly shows that momentum trading strategies are profitable only among the highest credit risk firms. This may suggest that aggregate momentum payoffs are higher during recessionary periods when credit risk is a major concern. However, as noted earlier, the time-series analysis demonstrates that momentum profitability does vary with the business cycle, but apparently in the wrong direction, that is momentum payoffs are economically and statistically significant only during expansions when there are fewer defaults. This disagreement between the cross-sectional and time-series findings is a puzzle that future work should address. For each month t, all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks on the monthly CRSP tape with returns for months t − 6 through t − 1 are ranked into decile portfolios according to their cumulative return during that period. We exclude stocks which at the end of month t − 1 are priced below $5 or are smaller than the smallest NYSE size decile. Decile portfolios are formed monthly and their returns are computed by weighting equally all firms in that decile ranking. The momentum strategy involves buying the winner portfolio P10 and selling the loser portfolio P1. The positions are held for the following six-months (t + 1 through t + 6). There is a one month lag between the formation and the holding periods. Monthly returns represent the equally-weighted average return from this month's momentum strategy and all strategies from up to five months ago. The table shows the average raw monthly profits during the holding period of the winner P10 and loser P1 portfolios as well as the momentum strategy returns. and for all stocks listed on CRSP. We exclude observations where at time t − 1 the price is below $5, and the market capitalization is in the lowest NYSE size decile. Returns are computed as the time-series mean of the cross-sectional average return for each month (in % per month). Standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, alphas, and betas, are computed for each stock and then averaged across all stocks. Alphas are in percentages per month. Alphas and betas are based on stocks with at least 25 return observations during the sample period. Size is computed as the time-series mean of the cross-sectional mean of all market capitalizations in each month (in $billions 
Table II Credit Rating Profile of Momentum Portfolios over Formation Period
For each month t, all stocks rated by Standard & Poor's with returns for months t − J through t − 1 (formation period) available on CRSP are ranked into decile portfolios according to their return during the formation period. We exclude stocks which at the end of month t − 1 are priced below $5 or are smaller than the smallest NYSE size decile. The table shows for each decile portfolio the median numeric S&P rating during formation periods of J=3, J=6, J=9, and J=12 months. This S&P rating is assigned by Standard & Poor's to a firm (not a bond) based on the overall quality of the firm's outstanding debt, either public or private. The rating is available from COMPUSTAT on a quarterly basis starting in 1985. We transform the S&P ratings into conventional numeric scores. The numeric rating corresponds to: AAA=1, AA+=2, AA=3, AA−=4, A+=5, A=6, A−=7, BBB+=8, BBB=9, BBB−=10, BB+=11, BB=12, BB−=13, B+=14, B=15, B−=16, CCC+=17, CCC=18, CCC−=19, CC=20, C=21, D=22. The sample includes 3,453 firms. 
Table III Composition of Momentum Portfolios
For each month t, all stocks rated by Standard & Poor's with returns for months t − 6 through t − 1 (formation period) available on CRSP are ranked into decile portfolios according to their return during the formation period. We exclude stocks which at the end of month t − 1 are priced below $5 or are smaller than the smallest NYSE size decile. The first three columns in the table show for each decile portfolio the percentage of stocks with no rating, and the percentage of stocks that are investment-grade (IG) and non-investment grade (NIG). The last three columns show the equally weighted average return of the three groups in each portfolio. IG represents S&P rating of BBB-or better and NIG represents S&P rating of BB+ or worse. There is a one month lag between the formation and the holding periods. The momentum strategy involves buying the winner portfolio and selling the loser portfolio and holding the position for six months. Since the momentum strategy is implemented each month, the monthly returns represent the equally-weighted average return from this month's momentum strategy and all strategies from up to five months ago. The table shows, for each credit rating group, the average returns of the momentum strategy, as well as the average return of the loser and winner portfolios. The sample period is July 1985 to December 2003. The numeric S&P rating is presented in ascending order by credit risk, i.e. 1=AAA, 2=AA+, 3=AA, ..., 21=C, 22=D. For each month t, all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks rated by S&P and available on CRSP with returns for months t − 6 through t − 1 are ranked into decile portfolios based on their return during that period. We exclude stocks which at the end of month t − 1 are priced below $5 or are smaller than the smallest NYSE size decile. Portfolio returns are computed monthly by weighting equally all firms in that decile ranking. The momentum strategy involves buying the winner and selling the loser portfolio and holding the position for six months (from t + 1 to t + 6). The monthly returns represent the equallyweighted average return from this month's momentum strategy and all strategies from up to five months ago. Each subsequent row in the table represents a monotonically decreasing sample of stocks obtained by sequentially excluding firms with the lowest credit rating. The first column shows the raw monthly profits from the momentum strategy for each subsample of firms. t-statistics are in parentheses. The second column shows the market capitalization of the given subsample as a percentage of the overall sample of S&P rated firms. For each month t, all stocks rated by Standard & Poor's with available return data for months t − 6 through t − 1 (formation period) are divided into 9 groups based on their size/volatility/leverage/cash flow volatility/age/analyst following/dispersion (bottom 30%, average 40%, and top 30%) and S&P rating (best 30%, average 40%, and worst 30%). We exclude stocks which at the end of month t − 1 are priced below $5 or are smaller than the smallest NYSE size decile. The table shows, for each group, the average returns of the momentum strategy, which involves buying the winner portfolio P10 of the best-performing 10% of the stocks based on their returns over the formation period and selling the loser portfolio P1 and holding the position for six months (t + 1 through t + 6). Cash Flow Volatility (CVOL) is computed as in Zhang (2006) as the standard deviation of cash flow from operations in the past 5 years (with a minimum of 3 years). The Age variable represents the number of months since the firm's IPO. If the IPO date is not available in Compustat, then the Age variables represents the number of months since CRSP first reported return data for this firm. Analyst coverage is computed as the average number of analysts following a firm. Analyst dispersion is measured as the standard deviation in analyst EPS forecasts for the next quarter, extracted from I/B/E/S. 3 The entire spectrum of ratings is as follows. AAA=1, AA+=2, AA=3, AA−=4, A+=5, A=6, A−=7, BBB+=8, BBB=9, BBB−=10, BB+=11, BB=12, BB−=13, B+=14, B=15, B−=16, CCC+=17, CCC=18, CCC−=19, CC=20, C=21, D=22.
4 A number of stocks delist from our sample over the holding period. Loser stocks are likely to delist due to low prices or bankruptcy while winner stocks may delist due to an acquisition. This could potentially lead to biased results. To ensure that there are no delisting biases, throughout the paper, we use the delisting return whenever a stock disappears from our sample. 5 We have verified that our results hold for independent sorts as well.
6 Recessionary and expansionary months are identified by NBER.
7 Jiang, Lee, and Zhang (2006) also show that high information uncertainty stocks have lower future returns.
8 Monthly volatility for a stock is the sum of the square of the daily returns within the month and leverage is defined as the ratio of book value of debt to the market value of equity.
9 Firm age is measured as the number of months since the firm's IPO.
10 Cash flow volatility is computed as in Zhang (2006) .
